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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                    
Cowen, Circuit Judge: 
 John Agathos and Leonard DeMarsico, plaintiff trustees (the 
"Trustees") of the jointly administered Local 4-69 Welfare Fund 
(the "Welfare Fund") and the Local 4-69 Pension Fund (the 
"Pension Fund") appeal from an order of the district court that 
granted judgment in favor of defendant Starlite Motel 
("Starlite") on claims under a collective bargaining agreement.1  
In essence, the Trustees argue that the district court erred in: 
(1) determining that the Welfare Fund was not legally entitled to 
recover benefits paid to an ineligible employee in reliance on 
false statements made by Starlite; (2) concluding that only 
current Starlite employees could have colorable claims against 
the Pension Fund for benefits; (3) concluding that two current 
                     
1
.  In the original complaint in this matter, Local 69 (the 
"Union") also sought union dues on behalf of Starlite's 
unreported employees.  The Union is not pursuing its claims in 
this appeal. 
  
employees do not have colorable claims for pension benefits; and 
(4) concluding that a one year time limit for filing precludes 
claims for welfare benefits.  Because the district court 
correctly determined that the Welfare Fund was not entitled to 
recover benefits paid to the ineligible employee, we will affirm 
the district court's order in part.  Nevertheless, because we 
conclude that the district court failed to make factual findings 
and conclusions of law sufficient to determine whether the past 
and present employees of Starlite have colorable claims for 
pension and welfare benefits, we will reverse and remand on the 
remaining issues raised by the Trustees. 
 
 I. 
 The Local 4-69 Welfare Fund and the Local 4-69 Pension Fund 
(collectively "the Funds") are multiemployer employee benefit 
plans that were established in accordance with Section 302(c)(5) 
of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (as amended), and 
that are within the purview of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (as amended) ("ERISA").  Pursuant to ERISA 
and the Labor-Management Relations Act, contributions that 
employers owe under collective bargaining agreements are pooled 
to provide the benefits for all the participants and 
beneficiaries of the Funds. 
 On May 31, 1979, Starlite entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement that required it to make contributions to 
the Welfare and Pension Funds on behalf of its employees.  
Zuzanna Podkowa ("Podkowa") was an employee of Starlite until 
  
June 30, 1986.  At that time, she terminated her employment.  
After leaving Starlite, Podkowa submitted medical claims to the 
Welfare Fund even though she was no longer eligible for such 
benefits.  The Welfare Fund paid her $11,203.67 in benefits 
relying on a false report from Starlite that Podkowa was still 
employed. 
 Because of information disclosed as the result of Podkowa's 
claim, the Funds sought an audit of Starlite's books.  Starlite 
refused the audit and the Funds sued.  An audit of Starlite's 
records covering the period from January 1, 1984 to December 31, 
1990 conducted during discovery demonstrated that Starlite failed 
to report a number of employees who were covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement.  In addition, Starlite failed to 
make contributions to the Funds on behalf of these employees.  
The contributions due from Starlite totalled $52,665.00 for the 
Welfare Fund and $14,756.00 for the Pension Fund. 
 Without taking further evidence, the district court heard 
legal arguments on the above stipulated facts.  The court 
concluded that the payments made to Podkowa were made as a result 
of the failure of the Funds to conduct even the most minimal 
policing of Starlite's account, and denied recovery.  Agathos v. 
Starlite Motel, No. 89-2429, slip op. at 11 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 
1991).  Concerning the unreported employees, the district court 
concluded that the Funds suffered no damages because the 
unreported employees were never covered by the Funds and thus 
could not have made any claims for pension or welfare benefits.  
Id. at 8-9.  An appeal to this Court followed. 
  
 On appeal, we vacated the district court's judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings.  Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 
F.2d 1500, 1510 (3d Cir. 1992).  We determined that the district 
court failed to make clear the precise legal principles it 
considered in reaching its decision concerning the benefits paid 
to Podkowa.  Id. at 1508.  Accordingly, we remanded to the 
district court for it to decide whether the Funds could meet 
their burden of proving either fraud or breach of contract on the 
part of Starlite.  Id. 
 With respect to the claims for Welfare and Pension Fund 
contribution, we determined that we were unable to discern from 
the record which employees, if any, presently could bring a valid 
claim for benefits.  Id. at 1507.  We explained that if the 
employees cannot assert such claims, then a judgment for the 
Funds would compel Starlite to contribute to plans from which its 
employees obtained no benefits in the past and are powerless to 
derive any benefits in the future, a result that we described as 
a "pure windfall."  Id.  We therefore directed the district court 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine which, if any, 
unreported employees currently have colorable claims against the 
Funds for benefits.  Id.  Further, we explicitly placed the 
burden of proof on Starlite to demonstrate that particular 
employees no longer had colorable claims for benefits if Starlite 
wished to avoid making contributions on behalf of those 
employees.  Id. at 1507-08. 
 The district court on remand held an evidentiary hearing.  
At the hearing, the Trustees of the Welfare Fund admitted into 
  
evidence a written document attesting to the fact that on 
December 2, 1992 (after our first decision in this matter), the 
Trustees unanimously adopted a resolution to waive the time 
limits on submission of medical claims to the Welfare Fund for 
individuals for whom contributions should have been made by 
Starlite.  According to the Trustees, this waiver allows each of 
these employees to submit claims for welfare benefits without 
regard to any previously imposed time bar. 
 The district court rendered its decision following this 
hearing in a three page order.  The court determined that the 
Funds had not met their burden of proof in proving fraud or 
breach of contract with regard to their claim for monies paid to 
Podkowa.  According to the court, the Funds had not proven that 
they "were justified in relying" on Starlite's misrepresentation 
to their detriment and the Funds had not proven that the damages 
they sought flowed foreseeably from Starlite's breach.  Agathos 
v. Starlite Motel, No. 89-2429, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. May 27, 
1994).  The court again cited the failure of the Funds to police 
the Starlite account as the source of the damages at issue.  Id. 
 With respect to the claims for contribution, the district 
court stated that: 
 
 [H]aving determined that only two current employees of 
Starlite -- Luba Siemienuk and Mieczslaw Zielinski -- were 
also employed by Starlite during the period for which 
contributions are sought, and it having been represented to 
the court that neither employee presently could bring a 
valid claim for benefits accruing during the period for 
which contributions are now sought, and, indeed, that 
neither employee even has a claim for either welfare or 
pension benefits and, thus, as a matter of law any judgment 
for the Funds under the circumstances would be a pure 
  
windfall . . . judgment will be entered in favor of 
defendant. 
Id. at 2-3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The 
district court also stated in a footnote that: 
 
 There are no medical bills to submit, there are no claims 
for pensions because pensions have not vested, and, in any 
event, claims must be and were not submitted within one year 
from the date the claim was first incurred.  Def. Exh. 4, 8.  
While, following the Court of Appeals' decision and based on 
the "tenor" of that decision, the Funds purported to waive 
the time limits for the submission of medical claims during 
the period for which contributions were sought (thus 
implicitly requiring those contributions to be made in an 
attempt to back door both this court and the Court of 
Appeals, see Def. Exh. 5), the undisputed fact remains that 
only Ms. Siemienuk and Mr. Zielinski continue to work for 
Starlite and only they would qualify for benefits if they 
had colorable claims, which they do not. 
 
Id. at 2 n.2.  Accordingly, the district court entered judgment 
in favor of Starlite on May 27, 1994.  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction in this matter by virtue 
of Section 502(e)(1) of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(e)(1).  We exercise jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 following the remand that we directed and the 
final judgment entered by the district court. 
 
 III. 
 The Trustees argue that the district court erred in denying 
the Welfare Fund recovery for the benefits it paid to Podkowa.  
According to the Trustees, Starlite committed fraud and breached 
  
its contractual obligations by misrepresenting that Podkowa was a 
current employee at the time she made her claim for welfare 
benefits.  Further, the Trustees assert that the district court 
failed to take into account the realities in which multiemployer 
plans operate with respect to their abilities to police 
employer's accounts.  We are unpersuaded by the Trustees' 
arguments. 
 In our previous decision, we outlined the applicable legal 
principles for the district court to consider in assessing 
whether the Trustees could meet their burden of proving fraud or 
breach of contract.  Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1508.  We explained 
that under general principles of tort law, the elements of fraud 
are: (1) a material factual misrepresentation; (2) made with 
knowledge or belief of its falsity; (3) with the intention that 
the other party rely thereon; (4) resulting in justifiable 
reliance to that party to his detriment.  Id. (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 525-26 (1977)).  Further, we explained that 
for the Funds to recover for breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement, the Funds had to show that: (1) Starlite had a 
contractual obligation not to make reports or to remit 
contributions on behalf of individuals no longer in Starlite's 
employ; (2) Starlite breached this obligation; and (3) the 
damages sought by the Funds foreseeably flowed from the breach.  
Id. at 1509.  We directed the district court to make clear the 
precise legal principles it considered in reaching its decision.  
Id. at 1508. 
  
 Upon remand, the district court did make clear the precise 
legal principles it relied upon in denying the Welfare Fund2 
recovery for the benefits it paid to Podkowa.  With respect to 
the fraud claim, the district court found that while the Welfare 
Fund proved that Starlite made a material factual 
misrepresentation with knowledge of its falsity and with the 
intent that the Fund would rely on it, the Fund did not prove 
that it was "justified in relying on that misrepresentation" 
because the Fund "`failed to engage in even the most minimal 
policing of the Starlite account.'"  Agathos, No. 89-2429, slip 
op. at 3 (D.N.J. May 27, 1994) (quoting Agathos, 977 F.2d at 
1508).  According to the district court, it was the Welfare 
Fund's inaction that caused it to pay money to Podkowa that 
otherwise would not have been paid.  Id.  Because the district 
court determined that the Welfare Fund failed to meet its burden 
of proof on the element of justifiable reliance, we find that the 
court satisfied its obligation to articulate the precise legal 
principle under which it denied the Welfare Fund recovery. 
 Similarly, with respect to the breach of contract claim, the 
district court concluded that while the Welfare Fund proved that 
Starlite breached its contractual obligation not to make reports 
on behalf of individuals no longer in its employ, the Fund did 
                     
2
.  In its decision concerning the benefits paid to Podkowa, the 
district court consistently referred to "the Funds" as the entity 
with the dispute and burden of proof.  Agathos, No. 89-2429, slip 
op. at 3 (D.N.J. May 27, 1994).  Since the benefits paid to 
Podkowa were paid pursuant to the policies of the Welfare Fund, 
it is more precise to refer specifically to that entity rather 
than to "the Funds" in general when discussing this claim.      
  
not prove that the damages it sought flowed from that breach 
rather than from the Welfare Fund's failure even minimally to 
police the Starlite account.  Id.  Since the district court 
determined that the Fund failed to satisfy an essential element 
of a breach of contract claim -- that the damages flow 
"foreseeably from the breach" --  the court also fulfilled its 
obligation to articulate the precise legal principle by which it 
denied the Fund recovery on that claim.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district court's decision to deny the Welfare Fund 
recovery for benefits paid to Podkowa. 
 The Trustees assert that the district court failed to take 
into account the realities within which multiemployer plans 
operate in determining that the Welfare Fund did not adequately 
police the Starlite account.3  According to the Trustees, most 
multiemployer plans are forced to operate under a self-reporting 
system in which the plans must rely on contributing employers to 
provide information as to which employees are working at any 
given time.  While we are sympathetic to the problems such plans 
face in obtaining accurate information, we noted in our previous 
opinion that there was ample record support for the district 
court's finding that the Funds failed to engage in even the most 
minimal policing of the Starlite account.  Agathos, 977 F.2d at 
1508.  Under such circumstances, we cannot disagree with the 
                     
3
.  The Trustees also argue that the district court's ruling is 
inconsistent with ERISA and applicable precedent.  We find 
nothing in the language of ERISA or in the precedents that the 
Trustees cite that creates an inconsistency. 
  
district court's conclusion that the damages at issue flowed from 
the Welfare Fund's failure to police adequately the Starlite 
account, rather than from the misrepresentation by Starlite.  
Moreover, we believe that such an argument is an attempt by the 
Trustees to relitigate an issue already passed upon by the 
district court and implicitly affirmed by our previous decision 
in this matter.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the Trustees' 
arguments and we will uphold the decision of the district court. 
 
 IV. 
 The Trustees' next argument is that the district court erred 
by concluding that only current Starlite employees could have 
colorable claims against the Pension Fund for benefits.  
According to the Trustees, the district court erroneously 
interpreted our previous opinion to preclude colorable claims 
against Pension Fund benefits by employees who worked for 
Starlite in the past.  This error, the Trustees argue, improperly 
led the district court to limit its evidentiary hearing to a 
consideration of only those employees who had both worked for 
Starlite during the period for which contribution is sought4 and 
who are presently still working for Starlite.  The Trustees 
assert that the district court erred by failing to consider 
                     
4
.  The "period for which contribution is sought" is defined by 
the audit of Starlite's records conducted during discovery.  The 
audit covered the period from January 1, 1984 to December 31, 
1990.  Employees who worked for Starlite during the period for 
which contribution is sought, but who are not currently working 
for Starlite, are sometimes referred to in this opinion as "past 
employees" for purposes of convenience. 
  
employees who had earned credits toward pension vesting for time 
worked during the period for which contribution is sought, but 
who have now moved on to other employment. 
 The district court's three page decision in this matter does 
not provide an adequate basis to defeat the Trustees' argument.  
The district court's opinion states that "having determined that 
only two current employees of Starlite . . . were also employed 
by Starlite during the period for which contributions were 
sought, and it having been represented to the court that neither 
employee `presently could bring a valid claim for benefits,'"  
any judgment for the Funds "`would be a pure windfall.'"  
Agathos, No. 89-2429, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. May 27, 1994) (citing 
Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1507).  This statement fuels the Trustees' 
argument that the district court limited the evidentiary hearing 
to present employees.  Even more importantly, however, the 
district court simply made no findings concerning whether any 
past employees currently have a colorable claim for pension 
benefits.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the district 
court erred by failing to make such findings. 
 In our previous opinion, we explained that whether employees 
presently have a colorable claim for benefits depends on whether 
they would be able to submit claims against fully back-dated 
coverage once Starlite makes the requested contributions.  
Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1508.  We further explained that: 
 
 An employee has no colorable claim if a plan would not 
properly entertain the claim because it is time-barred, the 
employee has ceased working for Starlite and therefore no 
longer qualifies, or federal labor law precludes recovery.  
  
If, however, a Fund would be required to honor an employee's 
claim, then Starlite must contribute for that employee 
regardless of whether he or she in fact has a meritorious 
claim. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Concededly, one possible reading of this 
language in our previous opinion is that if an employee has 
ceased working for Starlite, the employee no longer has a 
colorable claim for any benefits.  Such a reading, however, does 
not give full effect to all the words in the above-quoted 
passage, and is certainly contrary to this Court's intentions. 
 The key phrase in the quoted passage that defines when an 
employee no longer has a colorable claim is, "if the plan would 
not properly entertain the claim."  Our list of possible 
scenarios when the plan might not entertain such claims, such as 
when a claim is time-barred, when an employee has ceased working 
for Starlite, or when Federal labor law precludes recovery, was 
not intended to be applied by mere incantation.  This principle 
is made clear by our final sentence which states that "if, 
however, a Fund would be required to honor an employee's claim, 
then Starlite must contribute for that employee regardless of 
whether he or she in fact has a meritorious claim." 
 The error in an interpretation which prevents consideration 
of past employees who may have claims for pension5 benefits is 
aptly pointed out by the Trustees' argument.  As the Trustees 
                     
5
.  Further supporting our reasoning in this case is the fact 
that in the paragraph at issue in our original decision we did 
not distinguish between the Pension Fund and the Welfare Fund.  
Accordingly, we were not focusing on the intricacies of each 
specific Fund's requirements for bringing claims for benefits 
based on past employment.   
  
correctly state, there may be employees who worked for Starlite 
during the period for which contribution is sought, who are not 
presently working for Starlite, but who nevertheless earned 
credit toward pension vesting.  It is undisputed that under the 
terms of the Pension Plan, an employee is required to work for 
ten years before the employee's pension vests.  It is also 
undisputed that if an employee ceases working for Starlite but 
obtains covered employment6 with another employer, that 
employee's years of service at Starlite will be counted toward 
the employee's retirement benefits unless he or she incurs a 
break in service that is not cured under the rules of the plan 
and/or under ERISA.  Thus, there may well be employees who worked 
for Starlite in the past, who are not working for Starlite now, 
but who moved on to other covered employment.  Such employees 
would have claims for benefits once they have completed the 
requisite number of years of service.  Accordingly, an 
interpretation of our previous opinion which does not provide for 
consideration of these past employees is erroneous.7 
                     
6
.  "Covered employment" is defined as employment with employers 
who: (1) have been accepted for participation in the plan by the 
Trustees; (2) have collective bargaining agreements requiring 
contributions to be made to the Fund; and (3) have become a party 
to the pension trust agreement.  Local No. 4-69 Pension Fund of 
the Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union; App. at 
136(a).  Thus, under the plan, an employee is able to move from 
one participating employer to another without loss of years 
earned toward vesting. 
7
.  In arguing that the analysis of colorable claims for pension 
benefits should not be limited to current employees, the Trustees 
referenced past employees who continued in covered employment 
after leaving Starlite.  We perceive no reason why past employees 
  
 Starlite countered this position at oral argument by 
suggesting that all past employees have incurred a break in 
service.8  Because the district court made no findings concerning 
past employees, we are unable to determine from this record 
whether these past employees have incurred a break in service.  
We do point out, however, that our previous opinion explicitly 
placed the burden on Starlite to prove which, if any, employees 
do not have colorable claims against the Pension Fund in order to 
avoid making contributions for those employees.  If Starlite is 
unable to fulfill its burden, it must make the requisite 
contributions.9  Accordingly, we will again reverse and remand 
this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine which, if any, unreported past Starlite employees 
currently have colorable claims for benefits.  At this hearing, 
the district court must focus on the specific reasons why the 
past employees do not have a colorable claim for benefits and 
must make appropriate findings as to those employees that 
Starlite has demonstrated do not have a colorable claim for 
benefits. 
(..continued) 
who worked in covered employment before their tenure with 
Starlite could not also have colorable claims for benefits. 
8
.  A "break in service" is defined by the plan and occurs when 
an employee fails to work a requisite number of hours in two 
consecutive years in "covered employment."  App. at 137a. 
9
.  Starlite argues that the Trustees have the burden of proving 
that its past employees have not incurred a break in service.  
Appellee's Brief at 19 n.7.  We are puzzled by Starlite's 
position since our previous opinion was explicit on the question 
of who bears the burden of proof and it makes clear that the 




 We next address the Trustees' claim that the district court 
erred in determining that the two current employees who also 
worked for Starlite during the period for which contribution is 
sought do not have colorable claims for pension benefits.   
According to the Trustees, the district court confused a 
colorable claim with a present claim for vested pension benefits 
in evaluating whether Starlite should make contributions on 
behalf of these employees.  The Trustees once again press their 
claim that while these employees have not yet worked enough years 
to have vested pensions, they may combine past years of service 
with future years of service and therefore they have potential 
claims against the Pension Fund.    
 We review the district court's findings of fact for clear 
error.  Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 
765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).  We exercise plenary review over the 
district court's application of the law to those facts.  Id. at 
766.  The district court found that Luba Siemienuk and Mieczslaw 
Zielinski, the two current employees who also worked for Starlite 
during the period for which contribution is sought, do not have 
colorable claims for pension benefits.  Agathos, No. 89-24-29, 
slip op. at 2 n.2 (D.N.J. May 27, 1994).  According to the 
district court, there are no claims for pensions because pensions 
have not vested.  Id.  
 While we accept the district court's factual conclusion that 
no pensions have vested, we are unable to find that this fact is 
  
dispositive of the relevant issue.  As the Trustees point out, a 
colorable claim for pension benefits does not depend on whether 
the employees' pensions have vested.  These employees may not yet 
have worked the requisite number of years for vesting, but the 
pension plan permits them to combine the time they have worked in 
the past with additional years worked in the future in order to 
complete the requisite number of years (assuming they have 
incurred no break in service).10 
 Once again, Starlite argues in its brief that these two 
employees have incurred a break in service.  Appellee's Brief at 
14.  Unfortunately, there is nothing in the district court's 
factual findings to support this conclusion.  Starlite may be 
correct, but sitting as an appellate court we are not in a 
position to make findings of fact.  See, e.g., Gilgillan v. City 
of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 931 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 987, 101 S. Ct. 2322 (1981).  Accordingly, we 
will also reverse and remand on the question of whether Starlite 
is liable for contributions to the Pension Fund on behalf of Luba 
Siemienuk and Mieczslaw Zielinski.  On remand, the district court 
                     
10
.  These employees would have claims for "credited service."  
We have previously held that a claim for credited service does 
not give rise to a "colorable claim" to vested benefits.  Shawley 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 989 F.2d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 1993).  In 
Shawley, we said "neither plaintiffs' credited service . . . nor 
the accrued benefit to which it gives rise is a `vested' benefit 
under [a pension plan] that would grant participant status" and 
give the employees standing to sue the pension plan under ERISA.  
Id.  Shawley does not preclude the existence of colorable claims 
in this case because the issue here is not whether former 
employees may currently sue the Pension Fund, but whether a 
future liability is sufficiently likely to justify requiring the 
employer to contribute to the Fund. 
  
must make a finding as to whether these employees incurred a 
break in service or another deficiency that would prevent them 
from having colorable claims for pension benefits.  If no such 
break in service or other deficiency exists, Starlite must make 
the requisite contributions on behalf of these employees.      
 
 VI. 
 The Trustees' final claim is that the district court erred 
by concluding that no one who worked for Starlite during the 
period for which contribution is sought has a colorable claim for 
welfare benefits.  According to the Trustees, the district court 
erroneously concluded that a one year time bar for submission of 
claims against the Welfare Fund could not be waived and barred 
all subsequent claims.11  The Trustees assert that they validly 
waived the time bar for submission of claims against the Welfare 
Fund in order to allow those employees who were covered for 
medical benefits, but who never received notice of such coverage, 
to submit claims. 
                     
11
.  Counsel for the Trustees points out in its brief that 
according to the Summary Plan Description of the Local 4-69 
Welfare Fund, a document inadvertently not offered into evidence 
at the evidentiary hearing, the actual time for submitting a 
claim for benefits is 90 days from the date on which a loss was 
first sustained.  Appellants' Brief at 35.  The Trustees explain 
that the one year time bar derives solely from a letter from the 
Fund's former counsel which was admitted into evidence.  We are 
not inclined to comment on the appropriate time period that 
governs such claims given the fact that the Summary Plan 
Description was not offered into evidence.   Nevertheless, the 
difference between the one year and 90 day rules does not appear 
relevant to the claim of the appellants that the district court 
erred in determining that the Trustees could not waive the time 
limitation.  
  
 Our review over questions of law such as the validity of the 
waiver is plenary.  Epstein, 13 F.3d at 766.  The district court 
engaged in a two-part analysis on the question of whether 
Starlite was liable for Welfare Fund contributions.  First, the 
district court determined that only two current employees -- Luba 
Siemienuk and Mieczslaw Zielinski -- were also employed by 
Starlite during the period for which contributions were sought.  
Agathos, No. 89-2429, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. May 27, 1994).  
Second, the district court determined that these two employees 
did not have medical claims to submit and "in any event, claims 
must be and were not submitted within one year from the date the 
claim was first incurred."  Id. at 2 n.2. 
 As we explained with respect to the Pension Fund, to the 
extent that the district court's opinion interprets our previous 
decision to summarily exclude past employees from consideration 
of whether these employees have "colorable claims," the district 
court erred.12  Thus, the essential issue that remains is whether 
all claims against the Welfare Fund for the period in question, 
by both past and present Starlite employees, are barred by a time 
limitation for filing.  The district court determined that the 
Trustees' purported waiver of the time for filing requirement was 
"an attempt to back door both this court and the Court of 
Appeals."  Id.  We disagree. 
   On December 2, 1992, the Trustees of the Local 4-69 
Welfare Fund held a meeting and adopted a unanimous resolution to 
                     
12
.  See supra part IV.  
  
waive the time limits for submitting medical claims for those 
employees for whom contributions should have been made by 
Starlite.  App. at 225a-27a.  According to the minutes of that 
meeting, the purpose of the waiver was to: 
 
 permit individuals for whom contributions should have been 
made under the collective bargaining agreement to submit 
medical bills to the Fund and to have the same paid in 
accordance with the then coverages of the Fund. 
Id. at 226a.  The Trustees assert that because the unreported 
employees were never made aware that they had coverage under the 
Welfare Fund, they could not have previously submitted claims for 
benefits and thus should be permitted to file claims now. 
 The district court did not analyze whether the Trustees were 
authorized to waive the time limitation, it merely concluded that 
such a "back door" tactic was inappropriate.  After examining the 
Trust Agreement, we observe that Article V, § 17 vests in the 
Trustees the "full and exclusive authority to determine all 
questions of coverage and eligibility, methods of providing or 
arranging for benefits and all other related matters."  App. at 
114a.  In addition, Article V, § 9(e) grants the Trustees the 
power to "do all acts, whether or not expressly authorized herein 
which the Trustees may deem necessary or proper for the 
protection of the property held hereunder."  App. at 109a.  Given 
such broad powers, and in light of the Trustees' reasonable 
position that unreported plan participants could not have 
submitted claims within the original claims period if they had 
never been notified that they were entitled to benefits, we 
  
cannot agree that the Trustees have acted improperly in lifting 
the time bar.13  Accordingly, we will reverse the district court 
in its decision to give the time bar preclusive effect. 
 On remand, the district court should consider the fact that 
our previous decision placed the burden of proof on Starlite to 
prove whether or not employees have colorable claims for Welfare 
benefits.  Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1507-08.  Accordingly, the 
district court must make findings of fact with respect to all the 
past and present employees who worked during the period for which 
contribution is sought in order to ascertain whether Starlite has 
satisfied its burden of proving that particular employees do not 
have colorable claims against the Welfare Fund.14  If Starlite 
cannot satisfy its burden as to one or more employees, it must 
make contributions to the Welfare Fund on behalf of those 
employees. 
                     
13
.  Our position is also in accord with two of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying ERISA, i.e., that trustees of plans: (1) 
take steps to identify all participants and beneficiaries, so 
that the trustees can make them aware of their status and rights 
and (2) act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it 
is entitled.  See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Pension Fund v. Central Transport Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571-72, 105 
S. Ct. 2833, 2841 (1985).  
14
.  The Trustees assert that our previous opinion defined a 
colorable claim to welfare benefits to be a colorable claim to 
coverage during the relevant period.  We disagree.  We believe 
that a colorable claim against the Welfare Fund must be based on 
an actual illness or injury during the covered period. 
 With respect to Siemienuk and Zielinski, the district court 
stated that there are "no medical bills to submit," but 
ultimately rested its conclusion on the applicability of the time 
bar.  If the district court is satisfied that Starlite has met 
its burden of proof concerning these two present employees 




 In sum, because the district court correctly concluded that 
the Trustees failed to prove the essential elements of fraud or 
breach of contract, we will affirm that court's order denying the 
Welfare Fund recovery for benefits paid to Ms. Podkowa.   
Nevertheless, because the district court erred in not making 
findings concerning whether past employees have colorable claims 
against the Pension Fund, we will reverse the district court's 
order in part and remand for further proceedings.  Further, 
because the district court confused a colorable claim with a 
vested claim for pension benefits, we will also reverse the 
district court's order denying the Pension Fund contribution for 
two current employees of Starlite and we will remand for further 
findings.  Finally, because the district court erred in 
concluding that the Trustees could not waive the time requirement 
for filing claims against the Welfare Fund, we will also reverse 
on this issue and remand for further findings consistent with 
this opinion. 
